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DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Trades Council: SUPREME COURT
CLARIFIES THE PROVISO TO
§8(6)(4) WHICH ALLOWS UNIONS
TO CONDUCT INFORMATIONAL
ACTIVITY.
In DeBartolo Corp. fl. Fla. Gulf Coast
Trades Council, __ U.S. _ , 108 S. Ct.
1392 (1988), the United States Supreme
Court, on a petition for certiorari, ruled
that peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied
by picketing, urging a consumer boycott
of a neutral employer was not coercive and
therefore not a violation of § 8(bX4) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
The Florida Gulf Coast Building and
Construction Trades Council (union)
peacefully handbilled the customers of a
shopping mall asking them not to shop at
any of the mall's stores. The union's dispute was with a construction company, for
one of the mall's tenants, whom they alleged paid substandard wages and fringe benefits to workers. The union hoped to
influence the merchants, through a consumer boycott, to put pressure on the construction company.
The owner of the mall, the Edward J.
DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo), filed
a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charging an unfair
labor practice pursuant to § 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relatons Act (NLRA).
The NLRB ruled that the union did not
violate the act because handbilling was
under the proviso for consumer publicity
used to inform a distributor's customers
that the manufacturer or producer of merchandise was involved in a labor dispute.
The ruling was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. However,
the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed and remanded the case because
the proviso to § 8(b)(4) did not cover the
situation where the mall merchants do not
distribute the construction company's pr~
ducts. The Court asked for a determination of whether the hand billing fell within
the prohibition of § 8(b)(4), and, if so,
whether it was protected by the first
amendment. Id. at ----> 108 S. Ct. 1392.
The NLRB reversed itself on remand
and decided that there was a violation of §
8(b)(4) because "handbilling and other
activity urging a consumer boycott constituted coercion." Id. However, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had
serious doubts about whether § 8(b)(4)
could constitutionally ban peaceful handbilling not involving nonspeech elements
and reversed the NLRB using the Supreme
Court's reasoning in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, Id. Due to important
labor and constitutional law issues, the

Court granted certiorari and affirmed.
Although the NLRB's interpretations of
the NLRA are normally entitled to deference, under the "Catholic Bishop's Rule",
where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe
the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress. Id. at - 0 108 S.
Ct. 1397. The NLRB's construction of the
statute, as applied in this case, posed
serious questions of the validity of § 8(b)(4)
under the First Amendment. Id.
The handbilling was peaceful, truthfully
told customers about an existing labor dispute, and did not involve picketing. Similar acts by the union, such as generally
discussing low wages via literature distributed in town or radio advertisements,
would not violate the statute and would be
protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, handbills discussing a specific wage
dispute should be equally protected. To
hold otherwise "would require deciding
serious constitutional issues." Id. at __,
108 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
Next the Court reviewed whether Congress intended to ban handbilling under §
8(b)(4). The legislative history, however,
clearly showed that a "union can hand out
handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all
publicity short of ambulatory picketing in
front of a secondary site." Id. at __, 108
S. Ct. at 1404.
The decision in DeBartolo establishes
that the proviso to § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act is a clarification
which allows unions to conduct informational activity short of picketing. Ii The
proviso need not be treated as establishing
an exception to an otherwise all encompassing NLRA prohibition on publicity.
Rather it provides protection from communication, such as picketing, which
would be considered coercive.

-Andrea White Steele

Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n:
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT A
STATE MAY NOT CATEGORICALLY PROHIBIT TARGETED, TRUTHFUL AND NONDECEPTIVE
LAWYER ADVERTISING.
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,
_U.S ......., 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988), the
United States Supreme Court held that a
state may not, consistent with the first and
fourteenth amendments, categorically pr~
hibit lawyers from soliciting legal business
for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and
nondeceptive letters to potential clients
known to face a particular legal problem.
In 1985 Shapero, a member of the Kentucky Bar, sought the Kentucky Attorneys
Advertising Commission's approval of a
letter that he proposed to send to potential
clients who had pending foreclosure
actions. In part the proposed letter stated
that "you may be about to lose your
home," that "[f]ederallaw may allow you
to keep your home by ORDERING your
creditor [sic] to STOP," that "[y]ou may
call my office for FREE information," and
that "[i]t may surprise you what I may be
able to do for you." The Commission did
not find the letter to be false or misleading
but found it contrary to the existing Kentucky Supreme Court rule which prohibits direct mailing to specific individuals as
distinguished from mailing to the general
public. 108 S. Ct. at 1919. The Commission, citing Zauderer v. Office of Dis·
ciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985),
offered its view that the Kentucky rule vi~
lated the first amendment and recommended that it be changed. 108 S. Ct. at
1920.
Shapero then sought an advisory opinion as to the rule's validity from the Kentucky
Bar
Association's
Ethics
Committee. The Committee indicated
that the rule was consistent with the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Rule 7.3. After reviewing the Committee's
opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court,
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citing Zauderer, replaced its rule with the
ABA Model Rule 7.3. Model Rule 7.3 also
prohibits targeted, direct mail solicitation
by lawyers for pecuniary gain without a
particularized finding that the solicitation
is false or misleading. The court did not
address the specific problem with its rule
nor how Rule 7.3 corrected it. fd.
The Supreme Court considered the issue
of whether the blanket prohibition of Rule
7.3 was consistent with the first amendment. The Court stated that a lawyer's
right to advertise was constitutionally protected commercial speech, and if not false
or deceptive and did not concern unlawful
activity, it could only be restricted by a
compelling governmental interest. "[S]tate
rules that are designed to prevent the
potential for deception and confusion ... may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the perceived
evil." fd. at 1921 (quoting fn re R./If.]., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
In Zauderer, the Supreme Court struck
down on Ohio rule that "categorically
prohibited solicitation of legal employment for pecuniary gain through advertisements containing information or advice,
even if truthful and nondeceptive, regarding a specific legal problem." 108 S. Ct. at
1921. It distinguished written advertisements from in-person solicitation by lawyers, which it had previously held in
Ohralik 'U. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S.
447 (1978) may be banned by a state. The
Court reasoned that Ohio could not prevent Zauderer from mass-mailing to the
general population his offer to represent
women who were injured by the Dalkon
Shield any more than it could prevent the
publication of the advertisement in the
newspaper. Similarly, the Court reasoned
that if Shapero's letter was not false or
deceptive, Kentucky could not constitutionally prohibit him sending identical letters to targeted individuals. 108 S. Ct. at
1921.
The Supreme Court observed that the
Kentucky Court disapproved Shapero's
letter because it was directed to a specific
group of people who were known to need
legal services rather than a broader group
who may have found the services useful.
However, the Court determined that the
"First Amendment does not permit a ban
on certain speech merely because it is more
efficient .... " fd.
The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that its ban on targeted, direct mail
solicitation was proper because of the
potential abuse by lawyers. By analogy to
Ohralik (a state could categorically ban all
in-person solicitation), the court observed
that direct mail solicitation incurred the
same pitfalls as in-person solicitation by a

lawyer. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed that notion by stating that any
potential client would feel equally "overwhelmed by his legal troubles and will
have the same impaired capacity for good
judgment regardless of whether a lawyer
mails him an untargeted letter or exposes
him to a newspaper advertisement ... or
instead mails a targeted letter." fd. at 1922.
Additionally, the Court found the Kentucky court's reliance on Ohralik misplaced since that decision was based on
two factors. First, there was a strong possibility of improper lawyer conduCt in faceto-face solicitation. Secondly, there were
the inherent difficulties of regulating inperson solicitation since it was not open to
public scrutiny and therefore it had greater
potential for abuse. The Court stated that
the mode of communication makes the difference since there is much less a risk in the
targeted, direct-mail solicitation context.

Written communication did not involve
"the coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate," fd. at 1922
(quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
The Court differentiated written solicitation from in-person solicitation and discussed methods which could be used to
regulate targeted, direct mail solicitations.
For example, unlike in-person solicitation,
an advertisement can be set aside, ignored,
or discarded. 108 S. Ct. at 1923. They suggested that a state could regulate for potential abuses by requiring a lawyer to file any
solicitation letter with a state agency allowing the state to supervise and apply
sanctions to actual abuses. Likewise, the
state could require the lawyer to prove the
validity of the statements made in the letter, how the information was discovered
and verified, or it could require solicitation
letters to be labeled as an advertisement.
The Court emphasized that the free flow
of commercial speech was valuable enough
to impose the burden and cost on regulators in their efforts to scrutinize it. fd. at
1924.
Finally, the Court addressed the Kentucky court's contention that Shapero's
letter was so particularly overreaching that
it was unworthy of first amendment protection. The Kentucky court highlighted
two features which it addressed as being
high pressure and overbearing solicitation.
The first feature was the letter's use of
uppercase letters (e.g., "Call NOW, don't
wait"; it is FREE"). Secondly, the court
objected to the language in the letter (e.g.,
"It may surprise you what I may be able
to do for you") which it termed as "pure
salesman puffery, enticement for the unsophisticated, which commits Shapero to
nothing." fd.
The Supreme Court conceded that such
style may attract the reader's attention
more readily than a bland statement, but a
truthful, nondeceptive letter could never
be equated with face-to-face solicitation
which could lead to overreaching. "And as
long as the first amendment protects the
right to solicit legal business, the State may
claim no substantial interest in restricting
truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitation to those least likely to be read by the
recipient." fd.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court seems
to suggest that almost anything can be
done to solicit clients as long as it is not
false, misleading, misrepresented, or in
person. This decision may have dealt a
crippling blow to Rule 7.3 of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct which is
mirrored after the ABA Model Rule 7.3,
the subject of the Court's ruling.
-George L Cintron
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